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As the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic1 reached the Balkans2, Serbia3 has energetically taken its partnership with China4 to the next 
level. This happened as Belgrade embraced China’s 
“mask diplomacy” campaign5 of supplying medical 
equipment to the countries affected by the pandemic. 
However, while Russia has supplied aid to Serbia to 
combat the pandemic, it has not received the same 
attention from the Serbian leadership and public the 
way China did. The pandemic has shown that there is 
much less substance in the Serbo-Russian partnership 
than would be suggested by the shallow analysis of 
Orthodox and Slavic ties—and that Serbians are not 
“little Russians”6, as they are often purported to be. 
First, this is because Russian power capabilities in the 
Balkans are limited. Second, while Serbia still relies 
on Russia and its UN Security Council (UNSC) veto in 
regards to the Kosovo dispute, the two countries have 
very different interests in this process. Third, Russia 
does not trust Serbia’s most powerful political figure, 
President Aleksandar Vučić. While the pandemic will 
end at one point, Serbia is slowly replacing Russia 
with China as its preferable go-to address in the rank 
of non-Western powers.
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Russia Gives but Does Not Get
In the beginning of April7, after Serbian President 
Aleksandar Vučić appealed to the Russian President 
Vladimir Putin for aid, the Russian Ministry of Defence 
sent 11 military planes carrying medical equipment, 
protective gear and Russian military physicians. 
The exact numbers8 were said to involve 16 units 
of military medical equipment including diagnosis 
and disinfection equipment, along with 87 army 
medics specialised in virology and epidemiology. 
(By comparison, Moscow had sent just 14 military 
planes of aid to Italy9, a nation which was a much 
more prominent victim of the coronavirus at the 
time—and nine times the size). The generosity was 
immediately heralded as a testament to the Serbo-
Russian relationship, with President Vučić tweeting10, 
“Our friendship has been reaffirmed, and significant 
deliveries of aid are coming to Serbia. We thank 
Vladimir Putin and the Russian nation.” Vučić thanked 
Putin again in mid-May in a telephone conversation11 
held at the initiative of the Serbian side.
Just as well, the Serbian-Russian Humanitarian Centre, 
based in Niš, Serbia donated12 to the Serbian Ministry 
of Interior 3,000 caps, 600 visors, 200 goggles, 3,000 
masks, 100 pieces of filter mask, 3,000 coats and 
3,000 pairs of fittings. The politics of Russia’s aid—
and Serbia’s reception—were immediately clear. In an 
interview to the Serbian press, Russia’s Ambassador 
to Serbia Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko13 slammed 
the West for its “cynical“ misrepresentation of Russian 
aid while in another interview14 he reported that the 
Russian military specialists disinfected 160 facilities 
in 35 Serbian cities. However, even as the Russians 
made considerable progress with announcing their aid 
and demonstrating their success, Serbia did not return 
the favour with the usual platitudes that the ruling 
Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the government-
friendly media in Serbia tend to shower upon Russia 
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and Putin15. Indeed, when the aeroplanes 
carrying Russian military aid arrived, they 
were not greeted16 by Aleksandar Vučić, but 
by Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić and 
the Minister of Defence Aleksandar Vulin. 
Vučić’s absence was conspicuous. Not 
only because he has worked hard to build 
a personality cult17—and thus, one would 
expect, is inclined to demonstrate his 
centrality in the Serbo-Russian relationship—
but also because of his enthusiasm towards 
Chinese aid. In recent weeks, Vučić could be 
seen greeting18 an aircraft carrying Chinese 
medical aid and kissing the Chinese flag19.  
Although Russia, like China, has sought to 
heighten its profile and further its agenda 
during this pandemic, as disinformation 
reports20 from the EU have made clear, there 
is no indication of success in the way of a 
new Russian strategic assertiveness in the 
region. Instead, the lack of Russian visibility 
during this pandemic has shown that the 
Serbo-Russian partnership is limited and 
not as strong as generally thought.
 
Russia in the Balkans
The primary reason for Russia’s relative 
absence in Serbia during this pandemic 
is that Russian power capacities in the 
Balkans are limited in economic, military, 
and geographical terms. This leaves 
Russian influence in Serbia and the region 
reduced to three factors:21 energy, popularity 
among parts of the population (particularly 
in Serbia), and last but not least the 
Kosovo dispute.
Economically, Russia is not an irrelevant 
partner for Serbia, but it is still dwarfed by 
the EU in terms of trade flows. In 201922 
Serbia’s trade with the EU composed 62% of 
Serbia’s total trade, with exports accounting 
for 66.3% and imports accounting for 
58.2%. By comparison, Serbia’s trade 
with Russia and the Russia-led Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU) accounts for just 
8% of Serbia’s total trade, with exports 
totalling 5.4% and imports 9.4%. Even the 
free trade agreement23 that Serbia signed 
with the EAEU in October 2019 was signed 
not on its economic merits but as part of the 
Serbian balancing act between Russia and 
the West. For years, the EU24 has remained 
Serbia’s biggest donor, lender and investor. 
This makes Russia a secondary economic 
partner except in the energy domain25 
where Serbia, like the rest of the region, is 
dependent on Russia for both oil and gas.
In the military domain, Russia is also not 
a decisive factor, despite Serbia being an 
observer26 in the Russian-led Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (PA CSTO). 
In 2019, Serbia conducted 13 military 
exercises27 with NATO and four with Russia. 
Even the Slavic Shield28, the joint Serbo-
Russian exercises in 2019 where Russia 
demonstrated its famous S-400 air defence 
system and Pantsir missile battery, was not 
an indicator of blossoming bilateral military 
ties. For Serbia, this was just the way to 
maintain its stance of military neutrality and 
diplomatic balancing. In turn, Russia largely 
sees it as a way to provoke the West.
In August 201929, the Serbian Ministry of 
Defence published an overview of all military 
donations that Serbia received between 
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2008 and 2018. According to this data, the 
US was the largest military donor to Serbia, 
followed by China, Norway, Denmark and 
the UK. Russia was placed at a humble 
number nine. Although the Serbian Defence 
Ministry quickly came out with a statement 
to deny its document30, claiming that Russia 
would be the biggest donor to Serbia if the 
document included ongoing transactions, 
this was discounted by some of the Serbian 
observers31 as “marketing” aimed at courting 
pro-Russian segments of the Serbian 
public. Indeed, many of the Russian military 
donations to Serbia contain inconsistencies 
largely unknown to the Serbian public. Even 
the handover of six MiG-29 fighter jets 
from Russia to Serbia in 2017 as part of an 
effort to upgrade Serbia’s outdated air force 
has a catch32, as the jets themselves were 
donated by Russia but Serbia still had to 
pay Russia around 185 million USD for their 
repair. Through its military procurements 
and exercises, Serbia tries to maintain a 
semblance of balance without tilting fully 
towards Moscow, buying Russia’s Pantsir 
air-defence systems, but also going to 
France33 for Mistral, an infrared man-
portable air-defence systems (MANPADS).
Geographically, Russia is too far away from 
Serbia’s borders, and Russia cannot project 
its military might in the Balkans. Serbia is 
perfectly aware that it is encircled by NATO 
member states, a reality even more obvious 
as Montenegro34 joined NATO in 2017 and 
North Macedonia35 in 2020. At the same 
time, in 201936 Serbia adopted the second 
cycle of the Individual Partnership Action 
Plan (IPAP), the highest level of cooperation 
a country that does not aspire for 
membership can have with NATO based on 
Serbian membership in NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) programme. The Balkans 
remain outside the reach of Russian military 
might, except for the littoral countries of the 
Black Sea, such as Bulgaria, which is within 
maritime reach37 of Russian military forces.
This leaves the mentioned energy 
dependency and soft power appeal among 
the few remaining pillars of Russian 
influence in Serbia. Russian popularity38 in 
Serbia remains high, and Russian President 
Vladimir Putin remains the most popular 
foreign leader39 followed by Chinese 
President Xi Jinping. A December 201940 
survey showed that the majority of Serbs 
believed that Russia and China are the 
largest donors to Serbia, while in truth, it is 
the EU. For Serbian politicians41, balancing 
between Russia and the West is a way to 
avoid alienating pro-Russian voters and 
to try to win the votes of both pro-Western 
and pro-Russian Serbian citizens. A more 
striking example of this type of behaviour is 
Putin’s January 201942 visit to Serbia when 
120,000 people greeted him at the Orthodox 
Church of Saint Sava in Belgrade. However, 
it is important to note that pro-Russian 
sympathies within the Serbian public are 
the product43 of the memories of the 1990s 
and the independence of Kosovo—not of 
deep, genuine Russophilia. While in the 
polls44 Serbian citizens express solidarity 
with the Russian worldview, on “bread and 
butter” issues like employment, education 
and healthcare, they identify themselves 
with the Western world. Even Russian soft 
power has limits.
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All Roads Lead to Kosovo
Apart from energy dependency and soft power, 
the backbone of the Serbo-Russian partnership is 
the issue of Kosovo, as nothing has tied Belgrade 
more to Moscow than Serbia’s reliance on Russia’s 
veto in the UNSC. However, the interests that guide 
Belgrade and Moscow on the Kosovo issue are 
very different. 
Serbia is more than aware that its options on 
Kosovo are not great but that it has to engage in 
an ardent counter-secessionist policy to try to get 
a better deal on the Kosovo dispute. This deal from 
the standpoint of Serbian politicians implies some 
settlement where Serbia will not be perceived as 
the total loser of the dispute, and one that Serbian 
politicians hope will be able to sell to their people 
at home. In achieving this end, Serbia has relied on 
Russia. In the words of Milovan Drecun45, who chairs 
the Serbian Assembly’s Committee on Kosovo and 
Metohija (the Serbian name for the territory): “We 
need Russia to strengthen us with the Americans 
because when Russia puts its weight behind us, 
the Americans know that no solution can pass 
without its consent.” 
Russia, on the other hand, sees the Kosovo dispute 
as an opportunity to inject itself into Balkan 
geopolitics. By backing Serbia, Russia can use the 
issue46 either as a bargaining chip with the West 
or to undermine what it perceives as a unilateral 
project of the US. In this hypothetical bargain, 
Russia could try to trade its cooperation on Kosovo 
for acquiescence on the status of Crimea or for the 
lifting of Western sanctions against Russia. 
The differences between Serbia and Russia on 
Kosovo started to emerge in 2018 when President 
Vučić and Kosovo’s President, Hashim Thaçi 
proposed a land swap47 between the two sides as 
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a solution to the Kosovo dispute. US President Donald 
Trump48 gave his full support for the proposal, sending 
a letter to Vučić and Thaçi encouraging them to reach 
a final agreement and inviting them to celebrate it in 
the White House. 
However, in October 201849 Vučić met with Putin in 
Moscow to try to secure Russian support for his new 
Kosovo policy—an effort which amounted to little more 
than shallow diplomatic platitudes. Russia did not like 
the idea of the Kosovo dispute being resolved without 
Russian participation and without the opportunity for 
Russia to engage in a great power trade-off. Unlike the 
US, Russia sees no use in resolving the Kosovo dispute 
if Russia is not consulted and if Russia is not offered 
something in return. 
Moreover, Putin might in fact have a chance to reach 
the deal he desires. In October 201950 Donald Trump 
appointed Richard Grenell, US Ambassador to Germany 
and acting director of national intelligence (DNI), as 
special envoy for Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, showing 
Trump’s interest in the resolution of the dispute. This 
interest51 has been sparked by the EU’s inability to 
resolve the Kosovo dispute and Trump’s desire to score 
a foreign policy win ahead of the 2020 presidential 
elections. His fondness for Russia has been clear as 
well. When asked whether Russia could join Serbia-
Kosovo dialogue, Grenell’s spokesman Dick Custin52 
stated positively, “Everyone who can contribute ideas 
to help stability, peace and the prosperity of Serbia and 
Kosovo is welcome”. However, at present, it remains 
unclear whether the US is still backing the idea of a 
land swap. Naturally, as the COVD-19 pandemic now 
occupies so much attention in Washington’s domestic 
and foreign policy-making circles, the US might not be 
able to invest much effort into the Kosovo issue. 
For Russia, Kosovo is a gift that keeps on giving. With 
the issue of Kosovo, Russia was able to cheaply gain 
a foothold in Serbia and the Balkans that it otherwise 
Ultimately, despite 
the impressions 
one can get 
from official 
communication, 
there is not 
that much 
trust between 
Moscow and the 
most powerful 
man in Serbia, 
Aleksandar Vučić.
‘‘
‘‘
From Russia With Love? Serbia’s Lukewarm Reception of Russian Aid and Its Geopolitical Implications | Vuk Vuksanovic 9
would not have secured, and it got an 
opportunity to irritate the West at low risk. 
Russia also invokes the Kosovo precedent 
in the territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet 
space, as in the case of its annexation of 
Crimea53 in 2014. Brokering a deal where the 
West could not would be an even bigger boon 
to Russia’s strength and image in the region. 
For that reason, however, when it comes to 
negotiating the great power politics of the 
issue, Russia is likely to drag its feet on the 
dispute and refuse to make concessions to 
Washington unless Washington’s exchange-
offer is compelling. But if Belgrade is unable 
to win concessions from the US and Russia 
in that hypothetical bargain, the Serbian 
government would be in the most politically 
difficult position of having to explain to its 
citizens its failure to extract any meaningful 
benefit after twelve years of opposing 
Kosovo’s independence.
How Much Does Moscow 
Trust Aleksandar Vučić?
Ultimately, despite the impressions one can 
get from official communication, there is not 
that much trust between Moscow and the 
most powerful man in Serbia, Aleksandar 
Vučić. The coalition led by Vučić that has 
ruled Serbia since 2012 is composed of 
former associates of the Serbian strongman 
Slobodan Milošević, and it has overseen a 
significant decline54 in Serbian democracy. 
However, with Vučić proving cooperative on 
the Kosovo dispute and migrant crisis, and 
safeguarding some stability in the region, 
the West will continue to turn a blind eye55 
towards these anti-democratic trends. 
Although Vučić plays the Russian card 
and makes emotional overtures towards 
Moscow, he is not a genuine Russophile. To 
be sure, there are those surrounding Vučić 
whose friendliness towards and preference 
for Russia are without question—such as 
the former president, Tomislav Nikolić, and 
the current foreign minister56, Ivica Dačić.57 
However, unlike these two, Vučić merely 
uses pro-government media and tabloids 
to indulge58 the pro-Russian sentiments 
of his constituents. In truth, Vučić knows 
that his ability to stay in power is more 
dependent on Western capitals. Moscow 
is aware of Vučić’s political showmanship 
and has expressed its displeasure through 
provocative diplomatic gestures,59 such as 
in 2017 when the Russian ambassador to 
Serbia gave a cheap trey as a gift to Vučić 
during the annual Russia Day celebration. 
The mistrust was also present during Putin’s 
theatrical visit to Belgrade in January 2019, 
as Putin cautiously avoided demonstrating 
any goodwill towards Vučić during his 
stay. When asked60 by the Serbian press if 
he would address the Serbian public, Putin 
replied curtly that the plan of the visit did not 
involve speaking at any rallies. After much 
foot-dragging, however, and after pleas from 
his host, Putin did address the crowd with 
a simple “Thank you for your friendship” in 
Serbian and Russian. While this was seen 
as a  “gift to Vučić,”61 given that the visit 
occurred when Vučić was facing massive 
anti-government demonstrations62, in truth 
it only served to show that the relationship 
between the two leaders is not particularly 
warm or sincere.
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That this relationship is not as smooth as usually believed 
also became apparent in November 2019,63 when a 2018 video 
appeared showing the officer of Russian military intelligence, the 
GRU, stationed in Russia’s embassy in Belgrade, bribing a former 
Serbian military officer. In December 2019, Vučić visited Putin 
in Sochi where the two repaired the damage caused by the spy 
scandal. Vučić needed to do so as he still needs Russia on the 
Kosovo issue. Moreover, Vučić is aware that if Putin were to veto 
any deal that Serbia negotiates on Kosovo, it would be his political 
downfall64 as the Serbian public would perceive that situation as 
indicating that the Russian leadership is more mindful of Serbia’s 
national interests than the Serbian leaders themselves. Thus 
Putin and Vučić remain in this marriage of convenience.
Conclusion – Exit Moscow, Enter Beijing
Serbia will not turn its back on Russia, if for no other reason than 
because of the lingering Kosovo issue. However, the limitations 
and mistrust between Belgrade and Moscow, largely unknown to 
observers, remain. In Russia’s place is China, with billboards in 
Belgrade reading “Thank you, brother Xi”,65 —not “Thank you, brother 
Putin”. For Serbia, wanting to build leverage in its engagement 
with the West, China66 is becoming a more appealing partner than 
Russia. The partnership with China is paying more dividends as 
well, with Serbia receiving67 USD 4 billion in direct investments 
and slightly over USD 5 billion in loans and infrastructure projects 
from China. Russia will wait for the pandemic to pass and for the 
Kosovo issue to come back to the fore to make its next move in 
the Balkans, leaving Serbia to try to juggle once again between 
Russia and the West. However, in the following years, we might 
hear the name Xi Jinping being mentioned more frequently than 
the name Vladimir Putin in Belgrade. 
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As the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic reached the 
Balkans, Serbia has energetically taken its partnership 
with China to the next level. This happened as Belgrade 
embraced China’s “mask diplomacy” campaign 
of supplying medical equipment to the countries 
affected by the pandemic. However, while Russia has 
supplied aid to Serbia to combat the pandemic, it 
has not received the same attention from the Serbian 
leadership and public the way China did. Therefore, 
the pandemic has proven to be a potent ‘revealer’ 
and reminder of the lack of substance and depth 
of differences in the Serbo-Russian partnership.
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